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Abstract 
This article explores the principles that should guide efforts to raise finance for 
climate action in developing countries.  The main conclusions are that, first, there is 
an important role for private finance, which would be facilitated by having pervasive 
and broadly uniform emissions pricing around the world.  Second, public finance is 
warranted by a range of market – and policy – failures associated with climate change 
and its mitigation.  Third, raising tax revenues may be preferable to borrowing as a 
means of raising public finance, although the economics is not clear-cut.  Public 
finance theory advocates taxing ‘bads,’ of which a number have escaped the tax base 
so far.  But it discourages hypothecation of specific revenue streams to particular uses.  
Fourth, how much could or should be raised by the many specific proposals for 
finance for climate action in developing countries is often uncertain.  So is how 
multiple schemes would interact.  Several schemes could depress carbon prices.  
Earmarking is often assumed to be justified despite the arguments to the contrary.  
Fifth, two sets of proposals do particularly well judged against this analysis:  (i) 
expanding the scale and scope of the CDM (ii) expanding the use of international 
financial institutions’ balance sheets. 
 
Keywords: financial mechanisms, economic assessment, less developed countries, 
hypothecation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 The author would like to thank Sam Fankhauser, Erik Haites, Mattia Romani and the anonymous 
referees for their help with this paper, without implicating them in any errors, omissions or judgements.  
He also acknowledges financial support by the Grantham Foundation for the Protection of the 
Environment. 
 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. THE FINANCING CHALLENGE 
 
Arresting human-induced climate change requires global action to reduce greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions sharply.  To have a 50% chance of keeping the global mean 
temperature increase below 2°C, global emissions have to fall by between 2.5% and 
3% per year on average between 2010 and 2050 (Bowen and Ranger, 2009).  
Developing economies2 now account for well over half of global emissions and their 
share is growing relative to that of developed economies,3  so if the 2°C ceiling is not 
to be exceeded, they will have to start reining in their emissions soon (Clarke et al, 
2009).  And as climate change is likely to hit poorer countries sooner and harder than 
it will hit developed nations, the former will have to undertake a disproportionate 
amount of adaptation.  A wide range of ethical frameworks suggest that developed 
countries should finance a significant share of the necessary spending on mitigation 
and adaptation in developing nations – 100% according to some value systems.4   
 
                                                 
2
 Defined as non-Annex 1 countries under the Kyoto Protocol.   
3
 Defined as Annex 1 countries under the Kyoto Protocol.  The 47 countries in the UNFCCC’s category 
of Least Developed Countries, in contrast, accounted for just over 4% of emissions and their aggregate 
emissions had been growing at an average 1.5% per year – a reminder that developing countries are by 
no means a homogeneous group as far as emissions are concerned. 
4
 Different ethical frameworks point to different allocation schemes in global cap-and-trade proposals, 
as illustrated by Höhne et al, 2005.  But virtually all entail large transfers to developing countries.  A 
more general discussion of the interaction of economics, ethics and climate change can be found in 
Dietz et al, 2009. 
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Reflecting this consensus, developed countries have agreed, as part of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), to cover the “agreed 
full incremental costs” of implementing mitigation measures and to “assist the 
developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of 
climate change in meeting costs of adaptation.”  These commitments have been 
reiterated in the Kyoto Protocol, the Bali Action Plan and the Copenhagen Accord, 
with the latter setting a goal for developed countries to mobilise jointly US$ 100 
billion a year by 2020 “to address the needs of developing countries.” 
 
This agenda raises several questions considered further below.  First, what should the 
balance be between private and public sources of finance?  Second, how can private 
sources of finance be generated?  Third, how should public funds be raised by 
individual governments and by international collaboration?  This article discusses the 
criteria that economic analysis suggests.  Fourth, it asks, how do specific proposals 
rate according to these criteria and others?  The article concludes with the hope that 
governments will act speedily to fulfil the promises of the Copenhagen Accord but 
without neglecting the principles of public finance in the process. 
 
2. PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SOURCES OF FINANCE 
 
The simple textbook prescription to deal with the greenhouse gas externality, a global 
cap-and-trade system with appropriate allocation of tradable emissions quotas across 
individuals, countries and time, would entail a reliance on private sources of finance. 
It would generate a world price for emissions, so that private agents would internalise 
the externalities they cause.  The lump-sum transfers across individuals necessary to 
 6 
correct any adverse distributional impact from the imposition of a price and the 
residual climate damages would be achieved by appropriate allocation of quotas.  The 
allocation could also be used to compensate those who had to spend proportionally 
more on adaptation.5  Private finance flows would be generated entirely in emission 
reduction markets.  Local investments in mitigation and adaptation would be financed 
by private agents in the developing countries themselves, with the help of their share 
of revenues from those markets and guided by the changes in relative prices over 
products and across time induced by the carbon price. 
 
However, this prescription is highly unrealistic.  In practice, the problem of the GHG 
externalities is compounded by several other market failures, many of which need to 
be tackled by public policy.  There are also public policy failures, such as the lack of 
credibility of the policy framework that can arise when governments cannot bind their 
successors.  Where climate-change action in developing countries involves these 
externalities, financial support from developed nations is likely to have to involve 
public finance.  Also, emission reduction markets cannot be relied upon to deliver 
resources to all those who need to make climate-related investments, particularly 
those required for adaptation.  If projects in developing countries need to raise private 
finance abroad, they must be able to offer an expectation of an appropriate risk-
adjusted return, which in many cases they will be unable to do without public support, 
given the administrative costs and other obstacles. 
                                                 
5
 The second fundamental theorem of welfare economics states that, under certain (rather restrictive) 
conditions, every Pareto-efficient allocation of resources can be achieved by a competitive market 
equilibrium.  When it holds, the problems of efficiency and distributional impacts across individuals 
can be separated (Varian, 2009).  If introducing emissions pricing to correct the inefficiency induced by 
the GHG externality has adverse distributional consequences, these can be corrected by lump-sum 
transfers, set to ensure that at least someone is better off after the pricing is implemented while no-one 
else is made worse off.  The point here is not to rehearse the restrictiveness of the assumptions 
necessary for the theorem to hold (complete markets, perfect competition, etc), but to emphasise that in 
this framework lump-sum transfers are necessary for the introduction of emissions pricing to be 
unambiguously welfare-enhancing. 
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One key market failure affects innovation.  Many types of knowledge have the 
characteristics of a public good – one firm using an idea does not prevent another firm 
from doing so.  That tends to lead to underinvestment in the creation of knowledge.  
Hence public subsidies to such activities are warranted, including to climate-related 
R&D tailored to the needs of developing countries.  The public sector can redirect 
technological progress by supporting development of low-carbon technologies that 
have not benefited from extensive experience.  But the initial costs of adopting a low-
carbon development path will be higher, underlining the need for early public 
intervention to reduce emissions cost-effectively over time.  And there are numerous 
problems arising from inadequate and unevenly distributed information, which the 
public sector may be able to help solve by collecting and disseminating knowledge 
that would be under-provided by the private sector. 
 
Another important source of market failure is the existence of network externalities: 
an enterprise joining a network does not take into account the benefits that accrue to 
others from the expansion of network membership.  Without public intervention, the 
market initially underinvests in expanding the network.  Hence public support is likely 
to be necessary for the development of network infrastructure in developing countries, 
notably in energy distribution.  It may be easier for the public sector to set up the 
network rather than to calibrate and apply the appropriate initial subsidies to stimulate 
private provision.  
 
The malfunctioning of financial intermediation is another obstacle to adequate private 
flows of finance.  Without political stability, regulatory certainty and administrative 
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simplicity, perceived risks can undermine incentives to invest in projects with large 
up-front costs (as is typical of many mitigation projects6).  That can make projects that 
appear to pass cost-benefit tests unattractive in practice.  And when private-sector 
financial intermediation is impaired (as it is at the moment) by reduced risk appetite, 
heightened doubts about counterparty solvency and increased uncertainty about asset 
valuations, the public sector may be able to act as a financial intermediary of last 
resort.  In some developing countries, financial intermediation is rudimentary or non-
existent, partly because of the low levels of income. 
 
A further reason for public-sector support for developing country actions is to 
demonstrate the commitment of developed-country policy-makers to announced 
policies, thus building credibility and strengthening the impact of incentives to alter 
private-sector behaviour.  Policy commitments that include financial or reputational 
incentives for all participating governments to achieve announced outcomes can 
enhance the credibility of the policies and help to align the interests of policy-makers 
more closely with those of private agents.  Thus public support for developing-
country actions, especially through multilateral frameworks endorsed collectively by 
all participating governments, can help to strengthen actions by the private sector. 
 
At present, with the credibility of international endeavours to achieve a global deal on 
climate change in question, uncertainty about the global climate policy regime after 
2012 increasing, firms in developed countries still cautious about investing and 
private trade and capital flows still impaired, support for developing countries’ actions 
in the near term is likely to have to be much more reliant on public funding than in the 
                                                 
6
 Thus private finance is likely to be easier to raise for project operation, where revenues and costs are 
more closely aligned in time, than for capital investment, unless there is public intervention. 
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future.  And pervasive market failures, together with the inability of dealing with 
international income distribution impacts simply with global quota allocations, justify 
some public component continuing in the long term.  But if global carbon markets can 
be developed further and their long-term credibility underpinned, the contribution 
from private funding could be much more substantial.  Such a contribution might also 
be less subject to the changes of political will and time inconsistency of policy-
makers, which have led to considerable scepticism about the reliability of developed 
countries’ pledges on development aid.   
 
The sources of finance for adaptation are likely to be somewhat different from those 
for mitigation.  Private economic agents will generally be in a better position than 
public authorities to assess most adaptation needs, given their variety and specificity 
to particular locations (although some infrastructure investment is likely to require 
more government involvement).  Many adaptation investments will be small-scale and 
likely to be financed through conventional private means.  The challenge is to design 
mechanisms to distribute flows of public finance to support the incomes of those with 
the greatest adaptation needs and to help them with the costs of private finance.   
 
3. GENERATING PRIVATE FINANCE 
 
Economists have debated at length the merits of emission reduction markets relative 
to emissions taxation.7  The former approach ensures that, once negotiators have 
agreed on how the markets are to function and how property rights are to be assigned, 
private flows of funding are generated.  Developed-country governments do not have 
                                                 
7
 See, for example, Nordhaus (2007), who makes a trenchant case for carbon taxation in preference to 
global quotas, and Metcalf (2009). 
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to continue to redress the distributional impacts of climate-change mitigation policies, 
with the danger of reneging when public budgets are under pressure or particular 
recipients of financial flows become unpopular.  Some see this as an advantage of a 
markets-based approach compared with a ‘taxation and transfers’ regime under which 
developed countries make explicit transfers of public tax revenues to developing 
countries.8  However, a markets-based approach may be more susceptible to lobbying 
and capture by special interests.  Domestically, firms may lobby for free allocation of 
quotas, for example, by ‘grandfathering’ allocations.  That can inhibit competition and 
reduce the tax base of governments, making public transfers to developing countries 
more difficult to finance.  A global cap-and-trade scheme would also be likely to 
generate more rents for fossil-fuel exporters, whereas coordinated carbon taxes would 
allow domestic governments to capture the rents from carbon pricing.  The impact on 
international income distribution could undermine developed-country support for the 
carbon pricing regime, although it might be a necessary part of binding in fossil-fuel 
exporters to any global deal on climate-change policies.9 
 
A key objective of a markets-based approach should be to internalise the GHG 
externality, which entails GHG pricing: ‘getting prices right.’  In real-world schemes, 
different carbon instruments such as quotas within the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme, Clean Development Mechanism credits or auction prices for Assigned 
Amount Units, trade at different prices.  Some of these differences may reflect other 
characteristics of the instruments, but policy-makers need to consider whether the 
                                                 
8
 Stern (2009) is an example.  Frankel (2009) is another analysis that is sympathetic to the markets-
based approach behind Kyoto. 
9
 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for raising the issue of fossil-fuel exporters.  Aggressive 
mitigation policies are likely to lower the value of their resources and may depress (carbon-price-
exclusive) fossil-fuel prices.  To avoid Sinn’s ‘green paradox’ according to which climate-change 
policies may accelerate emissions (Sinn, 2008), it is important that they participate in any global deal.  
What side payments might be required is a moot point. 
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proliferation of carbon instruments is providing a blurred signal to potential providers 
of private finance.   
 
Perhaps more importantly, it is unlikely that the appropriate level and direction of 
private finance to developing countries will be ensured without domestic emissions 
prices (implicit or explicit) at levels broadly comparable across countries, both 
developed and developing.  Fossil-fuel subsidies, for example, will discourage private 
investment in low-carbon technologies and the absence of emissions pricing can 
encourage funding for investments that result in ‘carbon leakage’ from countries that 
do impose a carbon price. 
 
Private investors are concerned about carbon prices over time.  There is a role for 
policy-makers in reducing the uncertainty about future prices facing private agents, 
not least because it partly reflects uncertainty about policy-makers’ future behaviour.  
Thus private finance flows will be encouraged if the international policy framework 
and the rules and regulation of carbon markets are settled, clear and credible for the 
long term.  The design of such markets should also discourage price volatility (for 
example, by allowing banking – and perhaps borrowing – in Emissions Trading 
Schemes and ensuring liquidity and competition in carbon markets). 
 
As argued above, public finance may be necessary to leverage private finance.  It 
might include grants, interest-rate subsidies for private-sector project-finance, loan 
guarantees and insurance premia to help manage the risks unique to climate-change-
related investments.  Innovations like the Green Investment Bank proposed in the 
United Kingdom have considerable potential to help unlock private finance flows.  So 
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do the project finance vehicles that public bodies such as the international 
development banks have experience in building.  The public sector can also increase 
the long-term credibility of climate policies by devices such as equity co-investment 
and the issuance of indexed bonds that pay more when carbon prices fall, hence 
allowing carbon market participants to hedge their risks more easily.  The crucial 
requirement at this stage in the evolution of the international policy regime, given the 
economic environment, is for public institutions to help ‘de-risk’ investment 
opportunities for the private sector.  But it should also be noted that carbon markets 
can generate considerable rents from cheap abatement opportunities, which can lead 
to very generous private returns to compensate for the risks involved.10 
 
4. RAISING PUBLIC FINANCE 
 
Public finance theory, as articulated for example in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), 
Musgrave and Musgrave (1989) and Kay (1990), gives guidance as to how public 
finance for supporting developing countries’ actions should be raised.   
 
First, public authorities have a choice between raising taxes (or fees and user charges) 
and borrowing.  The general principle is to tax to finance current spending and borrow 
to finance public investment; the social return on the investment should be expected to 
exceed the cost of raising funds (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2004; Ismihan and Ozkan, 
2008).  From the perspective of a developed-country government, that suggests that 
transfers to developing countries should be financed by tax revenue.  But there is 
some ambiguity if the developing country uses transfers to invest in mitigation and 
                                                 
10
 Concern about the size of rents on intramarginal abatement opportunities has led to various proposals 
for price discrimination in carbon markets, not least with respect to the treatment of abatement 
opportunities in forest management. 
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adaptation that will pay off in the future; should the developed country count that as 
part of its own social return?   
 
If the case for countercyclical deficit financing by governments is accepted, that 
justifies a greater share of borrowing, but only in the downturn of the business cycle; 
an ‘exit strategy’ to substitute other funding sources is necessary if the associated 
spending is to continue during recovery.11  Another justification for more borrowing is 
if the government is in a better position than banks to act as a financial intermediary, 
for example because there are risks that can be better assessed and managed in the 
public sector – one of the arguments in a domestic context for public-sector 
sponsorship of ‘green’ investment banks (e.g. Green Investment Bank Commission, 
2010). 
 
Second, taxes should be levied on ‘bads’ such as emissions and congestion (Pigovian 
taxes; Pigou, 1932) and, where revenue requirements exceed what can be raised by 
taxing ‘bads’, ‘goods’ in more inelastic supply should be taxed more heavily.   That 
points to the desirability of working out how to tax ‘bads’ that are currently escaping 
the fiscal net.12 
 
Third, taxes raise questions of equity as well as efficiency.  Hence the ultimate 
incidence of new taxes needs to be considered and, if necessary, the welfare system 
adjusted to compensate losers.  In practice, that is often difficult without changing 
incentives and thereby affecting economic efficiency.  As a result, governments often 
                                                 
11
 The relationship between environmental policy and business cycles is discussed in Bowen and Stern, 
2010. 
12
 Unfortunately, governments are often better at identifying goods that they should subsidise because 
of the presence of market failures than they are at identifying untaxed bads.  But revenues from 
environmental taxes are surprisingly low in many countries (European Commission, 2008 and 2010a). 
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prefer to finance new obligations by raising tax revenues across the board, so that the 
incidence of the tax system is unchanged, on the assumption that it already broadly 
reflects distributional preferences and efficiency considerations. 
 
Fourth, traditional public finance theory frowns on hypothecation of revenues from 
particular sources to particular uses, except when setting a user charge to cover the 
marginal costs of a publicly provided good (OECD, 1996; McCleary, 1991).  With the 
latter exception, there is no reason why the revenue generated by the appropriate tax 
rate on one activity (e.g. global financial transactions) should equal the appropriate 
spending on another activity (e.g. public support for developing countries’ climate 
policies).  Even if tax rates and spending are initially set so as to bring about the 
equality needed, there is no guarantee that they will remain so over time. 
 
The same is true with many activities that are apparently related to each other.  For 
example, there is no reason why the revenue from an optimal global carbon tax should 
equal the optimal spending on adaptation and mitigation at the chosen target level of 
GHG concentrations in the atmosphere.  Indeed, the ‘double dividend’ literature13 is 
predicated on the possibility that revenues from carbon taxation (or quota auctions) 
could also be used to reduce distortionary taxes, such as payroll taxes, elsewhere in 
the economy.  The efforts to set different carbon prices for intramarginal mitigation 
(e.g. by establishing lower carbon prices for avoided deforestation than for electricity 
generation) suggest that policy-makers suspect that uniform carbon pricing could raise 
revenues well in excess of mitigation needs.  The mere fact that two activities are 
                                                 
13
 This literature is extensive and represents perhaps the richest strand of discussion of public finance 
issues in the climate-change policy arena.  See, inter alia, Bovenberg and Goulder (2002) and Schöb 
(2003). 
 15 
climate-related does not justify earmarking the revenues from taxing one of them for 
spending on the other. 
 
Some have argued that hypothecation is likely to make it easier to ensure that funds 
raised are additional to previous commitments by developed countries (Müller, 2008; 
Oxfam, 2008).  But finding a new source of revenue and then earmarking it does not 
prevent the earmarked spending from displacing spending, financed from other 
sources of tax revenue, on the same objectives.  Additionality is not guaranteed by 
how the funding is raised (Landau, 2003).   
 
Pirttilä (1998) has advanced a more sophisticated argument for hypothecation: 
hypothecating the revenues from environmental taxation to the provision of public 
goods that benefit the losers from the environmental policy may improve welfare 
(compared with lump-sum transfers) if governments do not have enough information 
to discriminate more carefully among the losers.  That provides some justification for 
allocating the revenues from carbon taxes or quota auctions to public goods benefiting 
those hit hardest by carbon pricing.  But it does not justify earmarking revenues from 
non-climate-related sources to climate actions, nor revenues from climate-related 
sources to mitigation that does not primarily benefit those affected most by carbon 
pricing. 
 
Brett and Keen (2000) offer a more political explanation for hypothecation, showing 
how a ‘green’ incumbent government may choose to earmark revenues if the 
efficiency loss from doing so is outweighed by the value of constraining subsequent 
and potentially ‘non-green’ policy-makers from diverting the funds raised.  Hence 
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hypothecation can be seen as a device to discourage back-sliding.  It is a moot point 
whether policy-makers at present are likely to be greener than their successors.  If so, 
that does not bode well for the long-term credibility of the international climate policy 
framework. 
 
Where specific sources of finance are hypothecated, given the drawbacks of 
earmarking, it is necessary to consider whether the revenue raised will over time meet 
either a specific financial target (such as the Copenhagen Accord’s US$ 100 billion 
per year) or, more generally, the equitable share of developing countries’ evolving 
climate action needs. 
 
Fifth, public finance theory flags the importance of administrative costs, including 
compliance and monitoring costs, so it is helpful to consider whether proposals entail 
new administrative burdens or use the most efficient existing tax-raising and 
disbursement channels.  Taxes applied to a broad base  but at low rates are attractive 
in this respect to keep tax avoidance activities low. 
 
International collaboration among developed-country governments is desirable in 
delivering public finance flows where these reflect obligations taken on in the context 
of international negotiations or where economies of scale in monitoring, verification 
and reporting are important.  But that does not imply that co-ordination of revenue 
sources is necessary.  Governments may agree about the appropriate uses of funds 
without agreeing about appropriate sources.  The exception to this principle is when 
new tax instruments are found to be desirable but would have cross-border 
implications, as with the taxation of, for example, cross-border pollutants, activities 
 17 
outside individual countries’ jurisdictions and cross-border financial transactions.  In 
such cases, the distributional implications of the new tax would have to be considered 
as well as the modalities of levying it. 
 
5. SOME SPECIFIC PROPOSALS 
 
There have been many specific proposals as to how to help finance developing-
country action on climate-change mitigation, adaptation and related capacity building, 
technology transfer and development.  This section considers several briefly in the 
light of the discussion above.  It also offers a preliminary assessment of the 
recommendations of the UN Secretary-General’;s High-Level Advisory Group on 
Climate Change Financing, which reported in November 2010.   
 
Most of the proposals entail raising public finance from particular sources, raising two 
key questions.  First, is hypothecation warranted in the case in question?  One test is 
to compare the proposed measure with raising finance through a general increase in 
domestic tax revenues by developed-country governments.  Second, collectively, is 
the balance right between public and private sources of finance?  
 
Other criteria suggested by the discussion above include: is the scale of funds raised 
appropriate?  If so, will it remain so?  In other words, is it reliable?  Given the likely 
administrative burdens (e.g. for tax enforcement, record-keeping and monitoring use), 
is the proposal practical and cost-efficient?  Is the ultimate incidence of the tax or 
interest burden appropriate, given the ethical framework(s) invoked to justify the 
generation of new finance in the first place?  Does the proposal assure that funds 
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raised are additional to obligations to developing countries previously acknowledged 
by developed countries?  And, in the language of the Copenhagen Accord, does the 
proposal ensure that financial flows take place “in the context of meaningful 
mitigation actions and transparency on implementation?” 
 
Expanding the use of carbon markets 
 
Several proposals have involved stimulating climate-related finance flows by 
extending the scope of carbon markets, primarily by expanding the scope of the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM); less emphasis has been placed on extending the 
number of countries using cap-and-trade systems with offsetting.  The CDM allows 
projects in developing countries that achieve emissions reductions (relative to an 
appropriate baseline) to generate Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) that can be 
used by Annex 1 countries to meet their national emission caps.  Private firms can 
purchase CERs to satisfy liabilities under domestic emission trading system caps; but 
governments can also buy CERs to meet their Kyoto Protocol caps or to provide 
climate finance.  According to UNEP, nearly 1 billion CERs will have been issued by 
the end of 2012.14  The UNFCCC has suggested that annual flows of US$ 15 - 20 
billion are possible while the European Commission suggests €38 billion.  And, as 
Hepburn (2009) points out, explicit CERs from the CDM (together with Joint 
Implementation) have probably leveraged ten times as much in overall investment 
from the private sector.15 
 
                                                 
14
 UNEP Risø Centre website, accessed 24 August 2010 
15
 Developed-country investors often sign emission reduction purchase agreements that involve 
payments at an early stage in the CDM project (often before it is registered) but at a price below the 
market price for CERs.  Thus the funding provided differs in timing and amount from the market value 
of the CERs generated. 
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The CDM has been criticised over bottlenecks and transactions costs.  Serious 
questions have also been raised over assessments of the additionality of proposed 
emissions reductions.  There is also the broader question of whether the lack of 
explicit carbon pricing in the countries eligible for the CDM has encouraged sufficient 
‘carbon leakage’ to outweigh any contribution to mitigation from the CDM (for 
example, by displacing to developing countries the export production of carbon-
intensive products that then becomes eligible for CDM credits).  But it has the merit 
of helping to set an implicit carbon price in non-Annex 1 countries (because of the 
opportunity cost of neglecting emission reduction possibilities), promoting the cost-
effectiveness of global mitigation efforts (relative to a world in which CDM-eligible 
countries had no incentive to mitigate) and demonstrating a track record of some 
success.  It also encourages decentralised private finance flows to developing 
countries.   
 
Proposals have therefore been made to scale up the CDM by increasing its scope 
beyond individual projects to sectors and emission-reduction programmes in 
developing countries and by helping more countries participate in the CER markets 
(China, India, Brazil and Mexico account for a very large share, although not 
necessarily much out of line with the distribution of incremental investment needs).16   
 
The CDM suffers, however, from the mounting uncertainty about what international 
policy regime will prevail after the end of the 2008-2012 Kyoto accounting period.  It 
has also been disadvantaged by the prospect of the price volatility that afflicts any 
                                                 
16
 The CDM has been much debated in the context of the evolution of the international climate policy 
regime.  See, for example, Schneider (2007) and papers from UNEP’s centre for Capacity 
Development for the Clean Development Mechanism http://cd4cdm.org/index.htm.  The Green 
Investment Schemes for post-communist Annex 1 countries may provide a useful model for a more 
flexible CDM (Tuerk et al, 2010). 
 20 
emissions-quantity-based scheme in the face of macroeconomic shocks.  Also, 
experience suggests that CDM private finance is more attracted to some project types 
that others – it does well with renewable energy and non-CO2 GHG abatement, but 
not so well with energy efficiency and transportation, probably because of the various 
additional market failures involved in the latter.  Another potential problem is that the 
extension of the CDM to low-abatement-cost options, for example, in forestry, could 
drive down the price of CERs.  One possible response would be the introduction of a 
new type of offset credit not fully fungible with the CERs.  But that would reduce the 
incentive for developing forest carbon sinks at the margin.  If the price of CERs fell 
too far, that would be a sign that developed country caps were not tight enough and 
should be brought down. 
 
Overall, expanding carbon markets in general and the CDM in particular looks an 
attractive option.  It stimulates private finance flows, helps to ‘get prices right,’ is 
overcoming administrative problems and has already been subject to much useful 
scrutiny.  Monitoring, verification and reporting are already a central concern.  
Hypothecation is justified if one believes that the level of emission reduction targets 
assigned to Annex 1 countries is appropriate given the required reduction in global 
emissions by 2050 and ethical perspectives on equity across countries.  The scale 
could be big enough at least to address developing countries’ mitigation needs.  But 
the precise size of flows is difficult to predict, depending on, among other factors, 
emissions prices in developed countries and the offset rules they adopt.  National and 
international climate policy regimes have to ensure that demand for offsets rises along 
with their supply or, in other words, that effective carbon prices are kept high enough 
to match the level of global ambition for climate-change mitigation. 
 21 
 
Multilateral proposals: climate-related sources 
 
(i) International auctioning of emission quotas 
 
Proposals have been made for the proceeds of auctions of emissions quotas to be 
earmarked for climate action funds, thus using another climate-related source of 
finance.  Norway has suggested some Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) could be 
auctioned by an international body (using Kyoto Protocol mechanisms) instead of 
issued to individual countries, with funds going to support climate action in 
developing countries, including support for their Nationally Appropriate Mitigation 
Activities (Center for Clean Air Policy, 2009).   
 
This category of proposals could generate substantial finance flows; a sale of 2% of 
AAUs could raise US$ 14-25 billion, depending on the price.  As with the CDM, it 
has the benefit of helping to establish an emissions price.  And, like the CDM, its 
revenue prospects depend on having a regime ensuring tight emission caps on Annex 
1 countries in the future.   
 
However, under the Norwegian proposal, countries may seek less stringent caps to 
compensate for some (or even more than) the AAUs auctioned.  That would reduce 
the environmental benefit and lower the price.  Second, private entities would need to 
be able to buy the AAUs and use them for compliance to create a demand for the 
AAUs (currently installations covered by the EU ETS cannot use AAUs).  If the 
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Russian and Ukrainian AAUs from 2008-2012 were used, that would generate a huge 
increase in the supply. 
 
(ii) Offset levies 
 
At present, a levy of 2% is imposed on all CDM transactions to help fund adaptation 
to climate change through the Adaptation Fund of the UNFCCC.  WRI (2008) 
describe this levy as the “iconic but largely untested” example of a truly global 
financing instrument.  It could raise around US$ 500 million between now and 2012 
(Fankhauser and Martin, 2010).  The proposals to extend the scale and scope of the 
CDM, mentioned above, introduce the possibility of raising considerably more 
through an offset levy of this sort.  The possibility of a 3-5% levy and an extension to 
Joint Implementation and Emission Trading are under discussion.  Fankhauser and 
Martin calculate that, with a broader CDM, a 10% levy could raise US$ 10 billion a 
year by 2020.17 
 
A major problem with the offset levy is that it is a tax on activities that economic 
analysis of the Kyoto framework suggests should be encouraged for reasons of cost 
effectiveness and equity.  Thus it is likely to reduce offset transactions and the 
implicit carbon price facing projects in developing countries.  The uncertainty about 
revenues from the CDM is compounded by the uncertainty about how a higher-rate 
levy would affect CDM flows.  Fankhauser and Martin point out that sellers of offset 
credits (developing countries) are likely to bear two thirds of the cost of the levy, 
                                                 
17
 Erik Haites points out that the CDM levy can be interpreted as being imposed on the CERs issued or 
the CERS traded internationally, since they will all be used in developed countries.  The base – issued 
or traded – makes a huge difference when a levy is to be applied to Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) 
and AAUs.  In the case of AAUs, it would be virtually identical to the Norwegian proposal. 
 23 
unless buyers in developed countries are subject to supplementarity restrictions i.e. 
limits on the proportion of their emissions that they can offset abroad.  With 
supplementarity limits, the incidence of the levy is likely to be almost entirely on the 
buyers.  Without supplementarity restrictions, the deadweight loss imposed by the 
levy rises sharply with the tax rate.  One reason why its extension is being discussed 
may be the ambivalent attitude of many towards offset mechanisms. 
 
(iii) Marine and aviation bunker fuel levies 
 
International aviation and shipping have largely escaped coverage by emissions 
reduction measures so far (although some air travel fees and taxes have been justified 
on environmental grounds, such as the UK’s Air Passenger Duty).  Aviation will be 
included in the EU ETS from January 2012.  Several proposals involving levies on 
estimated emissions, bunker fuel sales or some other activity measure likely to be 
correlated with environmental impact have been put forward.18  Keen and Strand 
(2007) point out that a fuel tax is more effective in curbing fuel consumption and thus 
carbon emissions, but a ticket tax has the potential to raise more revenue for climate 
policies in general and hence may be more useful for financing actions in developing 
countries.19  The main proposals are for uniform international implementation by the 
international regulatory bodies ICAO and IMO for aviation and shipping respectively, 
probably with exemption from similar domestic regulations.  The main problem that 
remains is compensation for vulnerable island states that would face large increases in 
transport costs. 
 
                                                 
18
 Some useful references include Müller and Hepburn (2006), Faber et al (2010), IMO (2009), ODI 
(2008) and McCollum et al (2009). 
19
 I am indebted to an anonymous referee for alerting me to this argument. 
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These proposals have the merit of advocating taxes on ‘bads’ that have largely 
escaped fiscal authorities because of their inherent cross-border characteristics and 
international governance.  As with other climate-related finance sources, some 
justification for hypothecation can be offered.  But revenue streams are uncertain, 
given uncertainty about the price elasticities involved and about the scope for 
avoidance.  There is a danger that the levies would introduce yet more inefficient 
variation in carbon prices across industry sectors (unless fully integrated with other 
international carbon markets) and their interaction with domestic cap-and-trade 
schemes and other emission reduction measures would have to be considered 
carefully (the airline industry, for example, has argued that if an international scheme 
is adopted, airlines should be exempted from domestic policies).  However, the 
amounts likely to be raised are far larger than the current or projected spending of the 
bodies (ICAO and IMO) that would collect the revenue, so they could commit to a 
steady stream of funding for climate-related purposes and allow any volatility in 
revenues to fall on rebates to their members. 
 
Multilateral proposals: non-climate-related sources 
 
(i) International financial institutions and funds 
 
A simple way of increasing funding for climate action is to increase the resources 
available to international financial institutions (IFIs), including the World Bank, the 
other multilateral development banks and the IMF.  The World Bank spent nearly 
US$ 3.5 billion on energy efficiency and renewable energy financing in fiscal year 
2009 and has pledged capital to the new Climate Investment Funds.  The other MDBs 
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have also been ramping up their climate-related project spending, although this has 
reflected diversion of existing development assistance rather than additional funding.  
The EBRD, for example, has specific targets for lending to meet climate policy goals.  
There are established mechanisms for increasing their capital through contributions by 
member governments, which can be leveraged to bring in private funds.  And they 
have some experience with developing innovative sources of finance, such as the 
Advanced Market Commitment for vaccines.  IMF staff have proposed a Green Fund 
that could raise US$ 100 billion a year by 2020 for climate action finance.  The Green 
Fund’s capital could be raised by member countries subscribing some of their Special 
Drawing Rights (SDRs) quotas, which were recently much expanded in response to 
the global financial crisis to build up the IMF’s ability to lend.  That could then 
leverage private finance through the issue of ‘green bonds’ guaranteed by members’ 
SDR reserves.20  However, the IMF’s Executive Board has not been enthusiastic 
about using SDRs in this way.  In addition to the IFIs, there are other funds such as 
the Global Environment Facility and the Adaptation Fund of the UNFCCC, the 
funding formulae for which could be amended to provide more finance, and new 
proposals on the horizon, such as the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund proposed in 
the Copenhagen Accord. 
 
Initiatives along these lines have the advantage of bringing in private finance, either at 
a ‘wholesale’ level, with partly private funding of IFI initiatives and multilateral 
funds, or at a ‘retail’ level, with IFIs and private finance co-funding specific 
mirtigation and adaptation measures.  The approach also (in the case of the 
development banks) utilises existing project appraisal skills.  Expanding the IFIs’ 
                                                 
20
 The IMF proposals are discussed in IMF (2010).  Williamson (2009) reviews the economics of 
SDRs, which are essentially an international form of fiat money.  The opportunity cost of using them 
for a Green Fund would be the reduction in their utility as reserve assets for the subscribing countries. 
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capital bases would not require the hypothecation of new forms of revenue.  Funds 
would be generated at an appropriate scale.  But subscribing countries’ contingent 
liabilities would be increased, as with the SDR proposals.  The main questions about 
such initiatives are more to do with the terms on which funds would be disbursed, 
such as the extent of concessionality, and the funds’ governance. 
 
(ii) Taxes on global ‘bads’ 
 
Landau (2003) suggests taxing congestion in maritime straits, rights to geostationary 
orbits and associated radio frequencies and arms sales – activities that generate more 
clear-cut adverse externalities than do financial transactions.  These taxes no doubt 
have merit on environmental or other social grounds and would probably need to be 
levied at an international level.  But the arguments against hypothecation apply with 
some force.  A tax raised by a supranational body could still be distributed to member 
nations according to some rule rather than earmarked to some collective international 
objective.  And the sums that would be raised are very uncertain, given that the issue 
of the optimal tax rates has not been explored. 
 
(iii) Financial transactions taxes 
 
Financial transactions taxes have been proposed as a way of reducing financial 
instruments’ price volatility and the excessive allocation of resources to financial 
market intermediation (e.g. Schulmeister et al, 2008; Baker, 2008) and can be seen as 
attempts to tax a social ‘bad.’  James Tobin proposed a tax on spot foreign exchange 
transactions to reduce currency speculation and volatile cross-border capital flows as 
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early as 1972.  They could raise significant sums; a tax rate of a mere 1-2 basis 
points21 could raise US$ 15-28 billion (but note that the euro trades against the US 
dollar with spreads as tight as 1/10th of a basis point).  Atkinson (2004) suggested this 
approach to funding the pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals. 
 
Such taxes suffer from three main drawbacks as sources of funding for climate action.  
First, the drawbacks of hypothecation are particularly relevant given competing 
potential uses for international funds of this sort.  Second, the amount that could be 
raised is very uncertain, because the price elasticity of transactions with respect to 
transactions costs is very uncertain and liable to change according to circumstance 
(e.g. whether there is a financial panic).  Some proposers want to limit the taxed 
activity while others hope that a very low tax rate would not affect trading volumes 
significantly.  Market liquidity could be impaired, thereby tending to increase 
volatility.  Third, it is not clear that the activities are necessarily bad.  Market liquidity 
and speculation in competitive markets are usually viewed by economists as desirable 
in helping to update prices quickly in response to new information.  Financial 
transactions taxes are not well designed to correct the underlying market failures that 
lead to financial crises.  Hence recently policy-makers’ attention has focused more on 
imposing additional liquidity and capital requirements on banks, and possibly taxes on 
some measure of balance-sheet growth, rather than on banks’ financial market 
transactions. 
 
There has been much empirical and theoretical research on such taxes.  The evidence 
does not give grounds for enthusiasm.  Hanke et al (2010) provides a brief up-to-date 
                                                 
21
 A basis point is 1/100 of a percentage point. 
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discussion of the literature.  One problem is that financial transactions taxes can 
simply become capitalised in the price of the assets traded, so that those holding the 
assets when the taxes are introduced bear all the costs (see, for example, Saporta and 
Kan (1997) on stamp duty and equity prices). 
 
Proposals based on national government contributions 
 
(i) National auctions of emissions quotas 
 
Some schemes rely on national auctions of allowances with the revenues flowing 
through national budgets and subject to national policy priorities.  Germany allocates 
part of the revenues from auctions of quotas under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
to its International Climate Initiative.  The European Commission proposes extending 
this practice (European Commission, 2010b).  The US Waxman-Markey Act planned 
to earmark a share of auction revenues from selling US allowances to international 
use (but probably determined bilaterally with US policymakers, not by international 
bodies). 
 
 The prices for allowance auctions under domestic cap-and-trade schemes, would be 
broadly similar to those of compliance units in the international market unless the 
domestic scheme restricts imports or exports of compliance units.  Intermittent 
auctions could contribute to price volatility.   
 
(ii) Carbon taxes 
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Switzerland has proposed a tax of US$ 2 tax per tonne of CO2 for emissions 
exceeding 1.5 tonnes per capita, with a share of the proceeds being subscribed to an 
international climate fund.  UNDP calculates that a tax of US$ 20 per tonne of CO2 
levied by the OECD on its members would raise US$ 265 billion at current emission 
levels (Swiss Confederation, 2008).  Several countries (e.g. Sweden, Denmark, 
Norway, Switzerland, Finland) already have carbon taxes on energy consumption, 
with various exemptions and allowances. 
 
This approach could, with a sufficiently high tax rate, generate a flow of funds on the 
scale required.  The political economy arguments for hypothecation would apply in 
this case (but the general argument against hypothecation would still have to be 
considered).  As with any ‘green’ taxes, which are designed to reduce the activity 
taxed rather than simply to raise revenue, there would be some uncertainty about the 
revenue flows, which would depend on the scope for decarbonisation.  One problem is 
the potential interaction with cap-and-trade schemes.  A tax on activities within scope 
of such schemes would simply depress the carbon price, so it would not have any 
additional environmental benefit.  A tax on activities outside such schemes would 
introduce multiple carbon prices, inducing allocative inefficiency.  The political 
acceptability of earmarking domestically raised taxes for international bodies at a rate 
determined outside the country is also in question.  A carbon tax, or any other 
hypothecated source, is at the same time a burden-sharing formula for the contributing 
countries.  Whereas agreement was eventually reached about the distribution of AAUs 
under the Kyoto Protocol, this instrument would re-open the debate about equity 
across developed countries. 
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(iii) Fossil-fuel royalties and subsidies 
 
Earmarking funds raised from fossil-fuel royalties or the removal of fossil-fuel 
subsidies would also raise national contributions from a broadly climate-related 
source.  Both sources of revenue have some economic justification as sources of 
general tax revenue.  Apart from the objection that, once again, the grounds for 
hypothecation to action for climate finance are flimsy, this would result in an implicit 
burden-sharing formula quite different from that agreed under Kyoto and would be 
likely to run into political opposition.  Fossil-fuel exporting countries stand to lose 
from carbon pricing and are therefore likely to be unenthusiastic about sacrificing 
further rents from their dwindling natural resources. 
 
(iv) Assessed or indicative contributions 
 
Proposals for assessed or indicative contributions start with an explicit burden-sharing 
formula and then let governments decide how to raise their contribution, whether with 
a carbon tax, reduced subsidies, higher royalties, other specific revenue sources or 
general revenue.   That avoids the problem of mandating hypothecation but requires 
agreement on the overall ambition and the specific formula to be used.  In practice, 
the latter is likely to be very difficult.  The USA has been unable to agree to the one 
implicit in the Kyoto Protocol, perhaps the most obvious candidate.  But the approach 
has been used, sometimes with special provisions for the United States, in cases where 
financial flows are much smaller than the expenditure anticipated for climate change – 
the UN operating budget, the UNEP core budget, and the Multilateral Fund of the 
Montreal Protocol, for example. 
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The report of the UN Secretary-General’;s High-Level Advisory Group on Climate 
Change Financing (HLAG) 
 
This report, commissioned at the Copenhagen Conference of the parties to the 
UNFCCC (COP 15) and published in November 2010, investigated the feasibility of 
achieving the Copenhagen pledge of US$ 100 billion a year.  It provides a careful 
review of the scope for raising funds through the types of measures discussed above, 
at greater length than is practical in this article.  The HLAG group potential sources of 
finance into public sources, development bank instruments, carbon market finance 
and private capital, assessing each against the eight criteria specified in their terms of 
reference:  revenue-raising capability, efficiency, equity, incidence, practicality, 
reliability, additionality and acceptability.  They conclude that the US$ 100 billion 
target is “challenging but feasible” if a variety of measures are taken, to stimulate both 
public and private financial flows.  However, they do not make specific 
recommendations for action.  Like the author of this article, the HLAG stresses that 
“[i]nstruments based on carbon pricing are particularly attractive because they both 
raise revenue and provide incentives for mitigation actions.”  The economic 
disadvantages of some proposals are mentioned (e.g. that levies on cap-abnd-trade 
offset purchases are effectively a tax on mitigation actions), although the drawbacks 
of revenue hypothecation are not fully explored. 
 
Two aspects of the report are particularly helpful.  First, quantitative estimates of the 
potential flows from particular measures are compiled on a consistent and transparent 
basis.  Where arbitrary assumptions have to be made, for example about the 
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proportion of new levies that would be earmarked for climate-change finance, they are 
lad out clearly and are consistent across instruments.  Second, a distinction is drawn 
between gross and net flows.  The latter are likely to be considerably lower than the 
former, particularly for private capital flows, given that private agents expect a 
competitive risk-adjusted return on their investments.  However, the report makes 
clear that not all members of the HLAG agreed about how net flows should be 
calculated or whether the target should be regarded as a target for net additional flows.  
There was also disagreement about whether private flows should be included.  As a 
result, the report does not provide an illustrative breakdown of how the target can be 
reached, although it is possible to piece one together from the assessments of 
individual measures.   
 
This article argues that considerations of equity warrant substantial transfers from 
developed to developing countries, so that the net basis is the appropriate one to use, 
notwithstanding the difficulties in estimating net flows.  Also, private and public net 
flows should be considered; private investment can still generate net flows to 
developing countries because there are intramarginal rents to be captured from 
mitigation and adaptation investments after deducting a competitive marginal rate of 
return.   
 
On this basis, the HLAG report suggests that, assuming a carbon price in 2020 of US$ 
20-25 per tonne of CO2 equivalent, public net flows derived from 10% of domestic 
carbon taxes or quota auction revenues, new taxes on aviation and maritime emissions 
and other new levies could amount to US$ 50 billion per year.  Private net investment 
flows could reach some US$ 10-20 billion per year and private transactions in carbon 
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markets could generate US$ 10 billion per year (a relatively modest amount compared 
with some other estimates in the literature).  Multilateral development banks could 
stimulate net flows of US$ 11 billion per year.  That leaves some US$ 10-20 billion 
per year to be raised from direct budgetary support – one measure of how challenging 
the target is.  If the carbon price were higher, the financial flows would be higher.  
The HLAG argues that its low and central carbon price assumptions are broadly 
consistent with the emission reduction pledges made so far under the Copenhagen 
Accord, while its ‘high’ carbon price assumption (up to US$ 50 per tonne) is more 
consistent with keeping the increase in global temperature to 2°C.  Hence if 
governments collectively take seriously their support for the 2°C limit, the challenge 
should be somewhat easier to meet.22 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
There is a reassuring level of agreement among international policy-makers that 
developed countries should help finance climate change actions in developing 
countries, despite the range of ethical frameworks that are brought to bear in 
negotiations.  The Copenhagen Accord’s target of raising US$ 100 billion dollars a 
year by 2020 is modest relative to developing countries’ probable needs.  The report 
of the UN Secretary-General’;s High-Level Advisory Group on Climate Change 
Financing plausibly suggests that generating US$ 100 billion is challenging but 
feasible, if a variety of measures are taken to stimulate private and public flows of 
finance.  Developing countries’ needs must be kept under review as understanding of 
                                                 
22
 Of course, more aggressive mitigation and higher carbon prices would also warrant more action by 
developing countries and more finance from developed nations.  It is not clear whether policy-makers 
see the US$ 100 billion target as consistent with the needs of developing countries in a world that takes 
the 2°C limit seriously. 
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the relevant science, economics and ethical considerations improves.  So should the 
contribution to be made by developed countries.  But this article has focused on the 
principles that should guide efforts to raise finance rather than how much should be 
raised and for what uses. 
 
The main conclusions are: 
• There is an important role for private finance.  The key incentive is to have 
pervasive and broadly uniform emissions pricing around the world.  Public 
authorities can stimulate private finance by helping to manage the risks of 
investing in mitigation, adaptation and technological innovation.  Building the 
credibility of the long-term international climate policy framework is one of the 
main challenges in this regard.  Private finance will be particularly important for 
adaptation, as the latter will depend to a greater extent on private decision-makers.  
And, within the right framework, it may be less subject to the vagaries of political 
popularity than public finance flows would be. 
• Public finance is warranted by a range of market – and policy – failures associated 
with climate change and its mitigation.  As well as the central environmental 
externality imposed by GHGs, there are problems in stimulating innovation, 
establishing infrastructure networks and overcoming barriers to financial 
intermediation.  That is particularly the case while the long-term outlook for 
climate policy is still unclear to prospective private investors and, because of the 
world economic slowdown, the short-term outlook for returns on any investment 
is poorer than usual.   
• Raising tax revenues may be preferable to borrowing as a means of raising public 
finance, although the economics is not clear-cut.  The current budget worries of 
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many developed countries tip the balance further (although the pace of fiscal 
retrenchment necessary is subject to robust debate), but the need to build policy 
credibility points in the opposite direction.  Theory also advocates taxing ‘bads,’ 
of which a number have escaped the tax base so far.  But it discourages 
hypothecation of specific revenue streams to particular uses. 
• There is a plethora of ideas and proposals for old and new forms of finance for 
climate action in developing countries.  How much could or should be raised is 
very uncertain in most cases.  So is how multiple schemes would interact.  Several 
could have untoward consequences for emissions prices.  Hypothecation is a 
frequent feature, with very little discussion of whether it is warranted.  In many 
cases, it is clearly not warranted. 
• Two sets of proposals do particularly well judged against this analysis:  (i) 
expanding the scale and scope of the CDM (ii) expanding the use of international 
financial institutions’ balance sheets, including the use of SDRs.  But, in both 
cases, governance arrangements are subject to controversy.  There are a number of 
other proposals for new taxes that have merit as far as revenue generation is 
concerned but the case for earmarking the revenue raised for climate-change 
finance is not wholly compelling, resting as it does on the supposed benefits of 
pre-commitment by developed-country governments rather than a quantitative 
assessment of developing countries’ needs.. 
 
It is to be hoped that governments will act speedily to fulfil the promises of the 
Copenhagen Accord but without neglecting the principles of public finance in the 
process. 
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